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WYETH V. LEVNE: MOVING AWAY FROM THE GEIER TREND
INTRODUCTION
Federal preemption of state common law actions for injuries often
involves a balancing act between congressional intent and state sove-
reignty.' The existence of federal agencies, such as the FDA, has raised
issues concerning the relationship between comprehensive regulatory
schemes and the residual role of state laws.2
Congress has done little to confront these issues,3 leading to various
interpretations of express preemption provisions. In cases of implied
preemption, the Supreme Court has employed the impossibility and ob-
stacle analyses for determining the availability of state common law re-
medies.4
The FDA's recent position establishing its standards as the "ceiling"
in safety determinations has triggered a debate between giving preemp-
tive effect to agency interpretations and preserving the presumption
against preemption expressed by saving clauses.5 In Wyeth v. Levine,6 the
Supreme Court sought to clarify these issues.
Part I of this Comment provides a general overview of preemption
and focuses on the preemption analysis the Court has previously em-
ployed with regard to FDA regulations. Part II summarizes the facts and
holding in Wyeth. Part III analyzes Wyeth, commends the Court's hold-
ing, but suggests a strict adherence to notice-and-comment rulemaking
and an abandonment of the obstacle analysis. This Comment concludes
by suggesting a classification of prescription drugs to balance the pre-
sumption against preemption with the FDA's safety determinations.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Supremacy Clause and the Preemption Doctrine
The Supremacy Clause states, "This Constitution, and the Laws of
the United States . .. shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitu-
tion or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.",7 The
1. See Sandra Zellner, Preemption by Stealth, 45 Hous. L. REv. 1659, 1666 (2009).
2. See Mary J. Davis, The Battle over Implied Preemption: Products Liability and the FDA,
48 B.C. L. REv. 1089, 1092-93 (2007).
3. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federali-
zation of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227, 251 (2007).
4. See Zellmer, supra note 1, at 1666.
5. See Davis, supra note 2, at 1092-93.
6. 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
7. U.S. CoNST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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preemption doctrine acts as "a tool for defining the parameters of federal
supremacy when Congress has adopted legislation pursuant to other
enumerated powers." 8 These pieces, working together, make clear that
the purpose of Congress acts as the ultimate "touch-stone" in every
preemption analysis. 9
Federal preemption can be express or implied.' ° Express preemption
occurs where Congress has included an express preemption provision in
the statute. Implied preemption arises either through field preemption,
"where the federal legislation is so comprehensive that Congress must
have intended to occupy the field," or through conflict preemption,
where state and federal laws conflict.
1 2
Implied conflict preemption overrides a state law that either creates
an impossibility of complying with both federal and state laws ("impos-
sibility analysis"), or "poses an obstacle to the achievement of federal
objectives" ("obstacle analysis").
13
However, because states have historically held traditional police
powers to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens,
preemption of state common law remedies is often complex and contro-
versial. 14 Federalism concerns drive a presumption against preemption of
state police powers where "a clear manifestation of congressional intent
to preempt" state laws and state common law remedies does not exist.'
5
Moreover, Congress generally includes a saving clause in its legislation,
which statutorily preserves the presumption against preemption.
6
Absent an express preemption provision in the statute, the Court has
employed both the impossibility and the obstacle analyses of implied
conflict preemption. In applying the preemption analysis, the U.S. Su-
preme Court, faced with federal regulations and state concerns, has va-
ried between its reliance on the statutory text and agency explanations in
determining the preemptive effect of a federal regulation.
7
B. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.
18
In Geier, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a state tort action was
preempted as an obstacle to the achievement of the Federal Motor Ve-
hicle Safety Standard ("FMVSS") 208.19 The standard, promulgated by
8. Zellmer, supra note 1, at 1665.






15. Id. at 1667.
16. See id. at 1660.
17. See Sharkey, supra note 3, at 258-59.
18. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
19. id. at 886.
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the Department of Transportation within its authority under the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act ("Safety Act"), sought a gradual
development of various passive restraint systems in cars-notably, the
installation of seat belts and airbags.20 Although the FMVSS was aimed
at reducing traffic accidents, it did not mandate a strict airbag standard
for all vehicles.2 '
The petitioner suffered injuries from a car crash and brought a
common law suit against Honda for not equipping the car with an air-
bag.22 The Court held that although the Safety Act did not expressly
preempt the "no airbag" suit,23 requiring manufacturers to install airbags
presented an obstacle to the mix of restraints allowed by the federal safe-
ty standard.24
In finding preemption by conflict, the Court gave weight to the
DOT's explanation contained in its litigation brief.25 The brief stated that
the FMVSS embodied the Secretary's policy judgment regarding safety
and that state tort actions would stand as an obstacle to federal objec-
tives.26 The Court justified its reliance on the agency's explanation by
pointing to the technical subject matter and the complex and extensive
nature of the relevant history, stating that the DOT likely had a unique
and thorough understanding of its own regulation and objectives.2 7
The Court further reasoned that "[t]o insist on a specific expression
of agency intent to pre-empt, made after notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing, would be in certain cases to tolerate conflicts that an agency, and
therefore Congress, is most unlikely to have intended. 28 The Court then
stated that the saving clause foresaw, and did not foreclose, preemption
of a state tort action when there was an actual conflict with the federal
standard.29 Furthermore, the preemption provision and the saving clause
20. Id. at 864-65.
21. Id. (noting that the FMVSS gave manufacturers a choice of restraints).
22. Id. at 865 (explaining that petitioner was injured after her car, which had been equipped
with manual belts but lacked airbags, collided with a tree); id. at 881 (claiming in her complaint that
Honda "had a duty to design, manufacture, distribute and sell a motor vehicle with an effective and
safe passive restraint system, including, but not limited to, airbags").
23. Id. at 867-68 (finding "no convincing indication that Congress wanted to pre-empt, not
only state statutes and regulations, but also common-law tort actions").
24. Id. at881.
25. Id. at 883.
26. Id. at 881 (stating that safety "would best be promoted if manufacturers installed alterna-
tive protection systems in their fleets rather than one particular system in every car" (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance,
Geier, 529 U.S. 861 (No. 98-1811), 1999 WL 1045155, at *25)).
27. Id. at 883 (emphasizing that the DOT is "'uniquely qualified' to comprehend the likely
impact of state requirements").
28. Id. at 885.
29. Id. at 870-71 ("[T]his Court has repeatedly 'decline[d] to give broad effect to saving
clauses where doing so would upset the careful regulatory scheme established by federal law."'
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106-107 (2000))).
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together created a neutral policy regarding conflict preemption.3° In ef-
fect, the Court overcame the traditional presumption against preemption
by giving preemptive effect to the DOT's interpretations.
C. Federal Food and Drug Laws
Congress enacted the Federal Food and Drugs Act in 1906, in re-
sponse to concerns raised by state regulators, prohibiting the manufacture
or shipment of adultered or misbranded food or drugs in interstate com-
merce.31 In 1938, Congress expanded the law to cover medical devices
through the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA").32 The
FDCA required premarket approval of new drugs, and required the man-
ufacturer to submit an application for approval to the FDA.33 Once a drug
received its initial approval from the FDA, any further changes to its
label had to be submitted and approved in a supplemental application.34
However, the FDA also allowed manufacturers to "add or strengthen an
instruction" through a "changes being effected" ("CBE") regulation for
any pre-approval additions that were intended to increase the safety of a
drug.
35
In 1962, Congress added a saving clause to the FDCA to protect
state sovereignty, establishing that a state law action would only be
preempted when in positive conflict with the FDCA.36 Fourteen years
later, Congress enacted the Medical Device Amendments ("MDA") es-
tablishing an express preemption provision for medical devices and clas-
sifying devices into three categories, with the highest risk devices identi-
fied as Class HI.
37
With regard to the FDA's rulemaking authority, Executive Order
13,132 directed agencies to provide states a notice and comment period
for proposed regulations that may affect them. 38 In 2006, the FDA prom-
ulgated new labeling rules through proper notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing, explaining that the proposed rules would not preempt state tort law.39
However, after the comment period closed, the FDA inserted a preamble
asserting that its regulations preempted state tort claims. 4° The 2006
30. Id. ("But we can find nothing in any natural reading of the two provisions that would
favor one set of policies over the other where a jury-imposed safety standard actually conflicts with a
federal safety standard.").
31. Davis, supra note 2, at 1100.
32. See id.
33. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1195 (2009).
34. Id. at 1196.
35. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(C) (2008)).
36. Id.
37. See Zellmer, supra note 1, at 1686, 1690.
38. Sharkey, supra note 3, at 253-54 (citing Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255,
43,257 (Aug. 4, 1999)).
39. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1201.
40. Christen Linke Young, Note, Agency Preemption Inputs in Riegel v. Medtronic, 118
YALE L.J. POCKEr PART 22, 25 (2008).
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preamble presented a dramatic shift toward preempting state laws that
deviated from federal labeling regulations and led to the controversial
debate on the role of agency safety determinations in the face of common
law tort claims. 4' The following cases illustrate how courts have applied
the preemption analysis to federal regulations.
1. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr
42
The Supreme Court in Lohr held that the MDA did not preempt a
state tort claim regarding a pacemaker that the FDA had approved as
being "substantially equivalent' 4 3 to other approved devices. 44 In ex-
amining the domain expressly preempted by the MDA, the Court found
that Congress did not intend to interfere with state remedies or "deprive
States of any role in protecting consumers. 45 It reasoned that the word
"requirements" in the MDA referred to additional state regulations but
excluded general state common law duties.46
Additionally, the Court held that the "substantially equivalent" ex-
ception to premarket approval was not intended to ensure the safety of a
device, but only established a status quo which included a possibility of
defending the device's design in a state tort suit.47 The Court concluded
that state requirements were only preempted where "the FDA has estab-
lished 'specific counterpart regulations or ... other specific requirements
applicable to a particular device.",,48 In its determination, the majority
seemed to apply an impossibility analysis by stating that the MDA did
not preempt state rules that merely duplicated the duties imposed by fed-
eral law.49
41. See Davis, supra note 2, at 1092-93.
42. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
43. Id. at 478 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(B) (1994))
(explaining devices the FDA considers "substantially equivalent" to approved devices can be mar-
keted without premarket approval in order to ensure timely introduction of improved devices).
44. Id. at 481-82 (stating that "no State ... may establish. . . any requirement which is differ-
ent from, or in addition to, any requirement... which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the
device" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994))).
45. Id. at 489. The Court relied on the presumption against preemption and congressional
intent, "'the ultimate touchstone' in every pre-emption case." Id. at 485 (first alteration in original)
(quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhom, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)).
46. Id. at 489 ("[Requirements refer to] device-specific enactments of positive law.., not the
application of general rules of common law by judges and juries.").
47. Id at 494 ("There is no suggestion in either the statutory scheme or the legislative history
that the § 510(k) exemption process was intended to do anything other than maintain the status quo
with respect to the marketing of existing medical devices and their substantial equivalents.").
48. Id. at 498 (alteration in original) (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (1995)); see also id. at 501
("The generality of those requirements make this quite unlike a case in which the Federal Govern-
ment has weighed the competing interests relevant to the particular requirement in question ... ").
49. See id. at 495 ("['lthe state requirement is not pre-empted unless it is 'different from, or
in addition to,' the federal requirement." (quoting § 360k(a)(1))).
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2. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.
50
In Riegel, the Supreme Court held that a state tort claim regarding a
failed FDA-approved Class III catheter was preempted by the MDA as
imposing state requirements that differed from, or added to, federal re-
quirements. 51 The Court distinguished the catheter from the pacemaker in
Lohr by finding that premarket approval imposed requirements under the
MDA.52 Whereas Lohr dealt with a device that only received an equiva-
lency review, the opinion emphasized that premarket approval was a
rigorous device-specific safety review that permitted almost no devia-
tions from the approved specifications. 53 The Court therefore held that
the state tort claim, requiring the catheter to be safer but less effective,
was preempted by the MDA.-4
II. WYETH V. LEVINE 5
A. Facts
On April 7, 2000, Diana Levine received the drug Phenergan by the
IV-push method for treatment of migraine-related nausea.56 Phenergan is
an antihistamine manufactured by Wyeth Pharmaceuticals for the treat-
ment of nausea.57 The drug can be administered intramuscularly or intra-
venously. 58 Intravenous administration can occur through the IV-push
method, which involves a forced delivery of the drug using a syringe, or
the IV-drip method, which slowly drips a mix of the drug and saline so-
lution from an intravenous bag into the vein.59 Phenergan is corrosive,
and causes gangrene upon contact with arterial blood.6° Of the two intra-
venous methods, IV-push creates a higher probability of gangrene be-
61
cause of the risk of intra-arterial injection.
The warning label for Phenergan initially met FDA standards in
1955 and continued to comply in its supplemental applications.62 In
1988, Wyeth submitted a revised warning label in response to the FDA's
suggestion of a different warning regarding the risks of intra-arterial in-
50. 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008).
51. Id.at 1011.
52. Id. at 1007.
53. Id. (stating that premarket approval is only given to devices that the FDA has determined
as providing "a reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness").
54. Id. at 1008.
55. 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
56. Id. at 1191. Ms. Levine had received the drug on previous visits to her local clinic for
treatment of migraine headaches. Id.




61. Id. at 1191-92.
62. Id. at 1192. The FDA approved the use of Phenergan in 1955 and again in supplemental
new drug applications in 1973 and 1976. Id
[Vol. 87:2
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jection.63 However, in 1998, without responding to Wyeth's 1988 sub-
mission, the FDA approved Wyeth's 1981 supplemental application and
directed Wyeth to keep its then current label. 64
Levine had initially received Phenergan through intramuscular in-
jections on previous visits for her migraine.65 However, the IV-push me-
thod was used on April 7 after an ineffective treatment earlier that day.
66
Following the treatment, Phenergan was accidentally released into Le-
vine's artery. 67 As a result, Levine developed gangrene, and doctors were
eventually forced to amputate her right arm.68
B. Procedural History
Levine sued Wyeth under Vermont's state product liability claims
of negligence and strict liability.69 Levine alleged that Wyeth failed to
warn clinicians to use the IV-drip method.70 Although Phenergan's label
did warn against intra-arterial injection, it did not specifically warn
against the IV-push method. 71 Wyeth filed a motion for summary judg-
ment, arguing that federal law preempted the state failure-to-warn claims
because the FDA had approved Phenergan's warning label.72
The Vermont trial court held the state law claims were not
preempted by federal law because Levine's claims did not conflict with
FDA regulations.73 Under FDA regulations,74 a manufacturer could
strengthen its warning label without first attaining FDA approval.75 The
jury found Wyeth negligent for failing to provide adequate warnings
about the risks involved with IV-push administration of Phenergan, even
63. Id. (explaining that after submitting a third supplemental application in 1981 in response
to a new FDA rule, Wyeth began corresponding with the FDA regarding its submission and in 1987,
the FDA suggested a revision).
64. Id. (stating that the FDA made a few changes to Phenergan's label that were unrelated to
intra-arterial injection then instructed Wyeth to "[r]etain verbiage in current label" (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
65. Id. at 1191.
66. Id.
67. Id. ("Phenergan entered Levine's artery, either because the needle penetrated an artery
directly or because the drug escaped from the vein into surrounding tissue . . . where it came in
contact with arterial blood.").
68. Id. ("[D]octors amputated first her right hand and then her entire forearm. In addition to
her pain and suffering, Levine incurred substantial medical expenses and the loss of her livelihood as
a professional musician.").
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1191-92.
71. Id. The warning stated in part: "Due to the close proximity of arteries and veins in the
areas most commonly used for intravenous injection, extreme care should be exercised to avoid
perivascular extravasation or inadvertent intra-arterial injection." Id. at 1191 n. 1 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
72. Id. at 1192 (contending that there was an "actual conflict between a specific FDA order"
and Levine's claim (internal quotation marks omitted)).
73. Id. at 1192-93.
74. Id. at 1196 (referencing the "changes being effected" ("CBE") regulation requiring manu-
facturers to change its label as new information becomes available).
75. Id. at 1193. The trial court had a record of at least twenty amputation reports since the
1960s. Id.
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if it had complied with FDA labeling requirements.76 The jury compen-
sated Levine for the amputation of her arm and the Vermont Supreme
Court affirmed, concluding that the federal FDA requirements created "a
floor, not a ceiling, for state regulation. ' 7
C. Majority
In a 6-3 decision authored by Justice Stevens, the U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed.78 The Court employed both an impossibility analysis and
an obstacle analysis to conclude that Levine's state law claims were not
preempted by federal law.79 In reaching its decision, the Court relied on
Lohr's fundamental principles of congressional purpose and presumption
against preemption.
First, in rejecting Wyeth's impossibility argument, the Court rea-
soned that the CBE's newly acquired information provision was not
strictly limited to new information, but also included any new analyses
of data that the FDA had already considered. 81 The Court found that
Wyeth had a duty to add to the warning when it became aware of the risk
of gangrene from IV-push injection of Phenergan.82 Therefore, it was not
impossible for Wyeth to add to the warning while still complying with
federal law.83 Furthermore, although the FDA could have subsequently
rejected the change, there was no evidence that the FDA would not have
allowed for a stronger warning. 84
Next, the Court rejected Wyeth's argument that complying with the
state-law duty "would obstruct the purposes and objectives" of the
76. Id. (stating that state tort liability "would not obstruct the FDA's work because the agency
had paid no more than passing attention to the question whether to warn against N-push administra-
tion of Phenergan").
77. Id. (agreeing with the trial court that "state law serves a compensatory function distinct
from federal regulation").
78. Id. at 1190, 1204.
79. Id. at 1204 (concluding that it was not impossible for Wyeth to comply with both state and
federal laws, and that the state claims did not "stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of Con-
gress' purposes in the FDCA").
80. Id. at 1194-95 (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
81. Id. (rejecting Wyeth's argument that unilaterally adding a warning would have subjected
it to misbranding liability).
82. Id. at 1197-98 (emphasizing that Wyeth had knowledge of at least twenty amputation
incidents prior to Levine's injury); see also Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes
for Approved Drugs, Biologics, and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 49,603, 49,605 (Aug. 22, 2008)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 314, 601, 814) ("Manufacturers continue to have a responsibility
under Federal law.., to maintain their labeling and update the labeling with new safety informa-
tion.").
83. Id. at 1198-99 (stating that the CBE regulation allowed Wyeth to revise Phenergan's
warning label before receiving FDA approval).
84. Id. (concluding that "the FDA had not made an affirmative decision to preserve the N-
push method or intended to prohibit Wyeth from strengthening its warning about N-push adminis-
tration"); see also id. at 1199 n.5 (noting that although Wyeth had proposed changes to Phenergan's
warning in 1988, these changes were rejected by the FDA because they were not materially different
or stronger than the original language of the warning).
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FDA. 85 The Court reasoned that the FDCA was enacted to further the
protection available to consumers and that the lack of a federal remedy
evidenced congressional intent for remedy under state laws.86 The Court
also distinguished prescription drugs from medical devices for which the
FDCA contained an express preemption provision.87 It concluded that
Congress's silence on prescription drugs, throughout the seventy years
that the FDCA had existed, revealed Congress's intent to preserve state
tort actions.
88
The majority rejected Wyeth's claim that the FDA "must be pre-
sumed to have performed a precise balancing of risks and benefits.
that leaves no room for state law judgments. 89 Wyeth relied on the 2006
FDA regulation preamble containing the FDA's commentary that FDCA
regulations created both a floor and a ceiling.9° However, the Court dis-
tinguished the preamble from the weight given to the DOT's explana-
tions in Geier as a "mere assertion that state law is an obstacle to achiev-
ing its statutory objectives.' 91
Although the majority conceded that an agency's statements ex-
plaining the impact of state law on federal objectives was entitled to
some deference, it reasoned that the amount given "depend[ed] on [the
explanation's] thoroughness, consistency, and persuasiveness. ' 93 Moreo-
ver, the 2006 preamble failed to bear any force, absent the opportunity
for states to comment, after the FDA's 2000 notice of proposed rulemak-
ing stated that the rule would "not contain policies that.., preempt State
law." 94 Finally, the Court buttressed its holding with Congress's
85. Id. at 1199.
86. Id. ("[Congress] determined that widely available state rights of action provided appropri-
ate relief for injured consumers.").
87. Id. at 1200.
88. Id. ("Its silence on the issue, coupled with its certain awareness of the prevalence of state
tort litigation, is powerful evidence that Congress did not intend FDA oversight to be the exclusive
means of ensuring drug safety and effectiveness.").
89. Id.
90. Id. ("[The preamble] stated that certain state-law actions, such as those involving failure-
to-warn claims, 'threaten FDA's statutorily prescribed role as the expert Federal agency responsible
for evaluating and regulating drugs."' (quoting Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for
Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products (pt. 2), 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3935 (Jan. 24, 2006)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201,314, 601))).
91. Id. at 1201.
92. Id. (stating that agency statements are entitled to some deference when "the subject matter
is technica[l] and the relevant history and background are complex and extensive" (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861,
883 (2000))).
93. Id. ("Even in such cases, however, we have not deferred to an agency's conclusion that
state law is pre-empted. Rather, we have attended to an agency's explanation of how state law af-
fects the regulatory scheme. While agencies have no special authority to pronounce on pre-emption
absent delegation by Congress, they do have a unique understanding of the statutes they administer
and an attendant ability to make informed determinations about how state requirements may pose an
'obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."').
94. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Requirements on Content and Format of
Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs and Biologics; Requirements for Prescription Drug Product
Labels, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,082, 81,103 (proposed Dec. 22, 2000) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 201)).
2010]
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longstanding view that state laws complement FDA regulations.95 The
FDA's limited resources and the ability of state tort claims to help reveal
unknown risks associated with drugs "lend force to the FDCA's premise
that manufacturers, not the FDA, bear primary responsibility for their
drug labeling at all times."96
D. Justice Thomas's Concurrence
Justice Thomas concurred with the majority opinion, agreeing that it
was not impossible for Wyeth to comply with both federal and state obli-
gations. 97 Aside from the narrower physical impossibility standard, Jus-
tice Thomas emphasized that impossibility under the broader direct con-
flict standard also did not exist because the FDA approval did not shield
Wyeth from liability.98
However, Justice Thomas criticized the application of the "purposes
and objectives" preemption jurisprudence, under the obstacle analysis, as
reaching beyond statutory text.99 Focusing heavily on preserving state
sovereignty, he characterized the Supremacy Clause as "accord[ing] pre-
emptive effect to only those policies that are actually authorized by and
effectuated through the statutory text." ° Justice Thomas criticized Geier
as facilitating "freewheeling, extratextual, and broad evaluations" of fed-
eral law by relying on agency explanations instead of the text of the sav-
ing clause. l 1 Justice Thomas also reprimanded the Court's interpretation
of Congress's silence as intent to allow state tort actions.1°2 He concluded
that although the Court reached the correct decision, the judgment should
have been based on the text of the statutory provision rather than the
Court's interpretation of congressional inaction.
0 3
95. Id. at 1201-02 ("(The FDA] cast federal labeling standards as a floor upon which States
could build and repeatedly disclaimed any attempt to pre-empt failure-to-warn claims.").
96. Id. at 1202 ("The FDA has limited resources to monitor the 11,000 drugs on the market,
and manufacturers have superior access to information about their drugs, especially in the postmar-
keting phase as new risks emerge.").
97. Id. at 1204-05 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Breyer wrote a separate concurring opi-
nion emphasizing the Court's statement that "we have no occasion in this case to consider the pre-
emptive effect of a specific agency regulation bearing the force of law." Id. at 1204. Justice Breyer's
concurrence is outside the scope of this Comment.
98. Id. at 1209.
99. Id. at 1205 ("Under this approach, the Court routinely invalidates state laws based on
perceived conflicts with broad federal policy objectives, legislative history, or generalized notions of
congressional purposes that are not embodied within the text of federal law.").
100. Id. at 1216 (emphasis added).
101. Id. at 1214, 1217.
102. Id. at 1216-17 ("[O]nce the Court shows a willingness to guess at the intent underlying
congressional inaction, the Court could just as easily rely on its own perceptions regarding congres-
sional inaction to give unduly broad pre-emptive effect to federal law.").
103. Id.:
Certainly, the absence of a statutory provision pre-empting all state tort suits related to
approved federal drug labels is pertinent to a finding that such lawsuits are not pre-
empted. But the relevance is in the fact that no statute explicitly pre-empts the lawsuits,
and not in any inferences that the Court may draw from congressional silence about the




Justice Alito authored the dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Scalia. The dissent argued that conflict preemption
prohibited state tort juries from overriding the FDA's drug safety deter-
minations.1°4 Justice Alito argued that Congress's purpose was clear in
"authorizing the FDA-not state tort juries-to determine when and un-
der what circumstances a drug is 'safe."' 0 5 Justice Alito further reasoned
that the FDA had extensively considered the costs and benefits of the IV-
push administration of Phenergan. 1°6 He stated that, as in Geier, conflict
preemption was not defeated by either a saving clause or the absence of
an express preemption provision as long as an actual conflict existed. 107
Furthermore, Justice Alito rejected the Court's interpretation of the
2006 preamble as having no weight,10 8 and instead argued that the FDA's
labeling decisions bear the force of law.' 9 Under Geier, the presumption
against preemption and an agency's specific intent to preempt through
notice-and-comment rulemaking were not relevant"0 where state tort
duties stood in actual conflict with federal objectives."' Finally, Justice
Alito stated that juries were "ill-equipped to perform the FDA's cost-
benefit-balancing function."" 2 He warned that juries would undermine
the drug-labeling function of the FDA and that those benefitting from the
drugs would suffer "if juries in all 50 states were free to contradict the
FDA's expert determinations."" 3
III. ANALYSIS
In Wyeth v. Levine, the Court properly reemphasized the importance
of congressional intent and the presumption against preemption as the
"cornerstones" of preemption jurisprudence." 4 In doing so, the Court
104. Id. at 1218-19 (Alito, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 1219-20 ("Neither the FDCA nor its implementing regulations suggest that juries
may second-guess the FDA's labeling decisions.").
106. Id. at 1222-26 (noting that the FDA cited numerous medical authorities to support IV-
push administration of Phenergan and provided specific extensive warnings of the associated risks).
107. Id. at 1220-21.
108. Id. at 1228 (stating that the FDA has an understanding of how state law could obstruct
federal objectives and therefore "can translate these understandings into particularized pre-emptive
intentions... through statements in regulations, preambles, interpretive statements, and responses to
comments" (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 506 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring))).
109. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)).
110. Id. ("It is well within the FDA's discretion to make its labeling decisions through adminis-
trative adjudications rather than through less-formal and less-flexible rulemaking proceedings, and
we have never previously held that our pre-emption analysis turns on the agency's choice of the
latter over the former." (citation omitted)).
111. Id. (stating that "pre-emption follows automatically by operation of the Supremacy
Clause" (emphasis added)).
112. Id. at 1229-30 (arguing that juries only see those injured by a drug but never see those
who have benefitted from the drug, whereas the FDA's judgments have considered all interests).
113. Id. at 1230.
114. Id. at 1194-95 (majority opinion).
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revamped the significance of a presumption against preemption in an
implied conflict preemption analysis. The Wyeth decision restored proper
weight to saving clauses and clarified the FDA approval debate by reject-
ing the approval of Phenergan as a conclusive statement of safety.
However, the Court's preamble analysis did not go far enough. A
more restrictive analysis of agency views would have led future cases
away from the Geier decision by requiring strict adherence to the notice-
and-comment rulemaking procedures. On a broader level, while the im-
possibility analysis warrants adherence, the Court's purposes and objec-
tives determinations in its obstacle analysis should be abandoned. Fur-
thermore, a classification of drugs based on their level of risk could help
clarify future preemption battles.
A. The Restoration of the Presumption Against Preemption
Although the presumption against preemption was relevant in Lohr,
the Geier Court failed to consider it in its conflict preemption determina-
tion. The Wyeth Court's holding, and its reliance on the longstanding
principle, signifies the importance of a presumption in all instances of
implied preemption and exposes the faulty reasoning in the wrongly de-
cided Geier case.
The Wyeth dissent misinterprets Geier's focus on actual conflict as
making a presumption against preemption irrelevant.' 15 Justice Stevens's
opinion restores harmony between federal power and state sovereignty
by starting with a respect for traditional state powers absent an express
preemption provision. By rejecting Wyeth's argument that the presump-
tion should not apply to instances where the federal government has
shown to have regulated drug labeling for over a century, the Wyeth
Court makes clear that the purpose of the principle is driven by a consid-
eration of states as "independent sovereigns in our federal system."
'1 16
Focusing on the cornerstones of preemption, the Wyeth Court properly
ensured that "the longstanding coexistence of state and federal law in the
115. See id. at 1195 n.3.
116. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485
(1996)); see also David A. Dana, Democratizing the Law of Federal Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L.
REv. 507, 511 (2008):
The federalism-based presumption against preemption suggests, by its very terms, that in
preemption cases the courts must balance the potential harm to the efficacy of democrati-
cally enacted federal law against the importance of federalism principles rooted in state
sovereignty. When the balance is close.., the court should come down on the side of no
preemption.
Matthew S. Reid, Comment, Vermont Supreme Court Rules That Food and Drug Administration
Regulations Do Not Preempt State Failure-to-Warn Claims: Levine v. Wyeth, 4 J. HEALTH &
BIOMEDICAL L. 413, 425 (2008):
[H]ealth and safety has traditionally been considered part of the states' police-powers
since the founding of the Republic and the attempts of a federal agency to encroach on
the traditional legal territory of the states should only occur with the manifest consent of
the Congress which is clearly not indicated here.
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area of pharmaceutical warning labels would remain intact"'117 and re-
jected the Geier Court's attempt to undercut this balance.
1 18
B. The Decision's Effect on Saving Clauses
The Wyeth Court's decision to preserve the presumption against
preemption principle also gives proper weight to saving clauses. Saving
clauses further reflect congressional intent to preserve state powers to
protect public health and welfare where a conflict with a federal law does
not exist.119 The Wyeth Court's emphasis on the presumption against
preemption-requiring clear congressional intent to preempt state reme-
dies-fortifies the general principle behind saving clauses.
The Geier Court previously rejected the presumption against
preemption, concluding that the existence of both a preemption provision
and a saving clause created a neutral policy of preemption. 120 This view,
however, undermines Congress's desire to avoid regulatory gaps left by
federal law by allowing for protection through state laws. 121 Whereas
preemption provisions, such as those in Lohr and Geier, are often ambi-
guous and can result in various delineations of state and federal law
boundaries, the presence of a saving clause remains clear in nearly all
instances as working to "leave ample room for state law to provide in-
creased protection above the federal regulatory floor."' 122 Furthermore,
giving proper effect to saving clauses could work to override the recent
deference given to agency interpretations by acting as further evidence of
congressional intent to retain state remedies.
The Wyeth decision is a step toward both dispelling the "neutral pol-
icy" trend of the Geier Court and restoring the significance of saving
clauses for future cases. 23 The Wyeth Court cured the inability of future
courts to both narrow an agency's preemptive scope and create a safe
harbor for state law. 124 By utilizing the saving clause to reject the pream-
ble's preemptive powers, the Wyeth Court avoided the risk of "sending
117. Dawn Goulet, Consumer News, LinkLine Decision Puts the Squeeze on the Price Squeeze
Theory of Liability, 21 LOY. CONSUMER L. REv. 429,434 (2009).
118. See Reid, supra note 116 ("The court accurately resolved the issue in a manner consistent
with judicial precedent, legislative history, and basic principles of federalism.").
119. See Zellmer, supra note 1, at 1660.
120. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 871 (2000).
121. See Zellmer, supra note 1, at 1668.
122. Id. at 1660.
123. See id. at 1702; see also id. at 1732 ("[G]iving savings clauses appropriate weight honors
congressional choices, avoids regulatory gaps, fosters innovative measures to protect human health
... and enhances institutional competency by empowering governments at all levels to protect the
public at appropriate scales.").
124. Young, supra note 40, at 26 ("If the Court relies on the agency's preamble in Wyeth and
holds the state law preempted, then successive majorities will have frowned upon the FDA's at-
tempts to limit preemption in Riegel, while welcoming its attempts to expand it in Wyeth. In the
hands of the Court, agency action defining preemptory authority risks becoming a one-way ratchet-
fully applicable in the service of strong federal preemption, but unable to narrow the preemptive
scope when it seeks to create a safe harbor for state law.").
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mixed messages to federal agencies-granting them authority to assert
broad preemption, but skeptically reviewing any attempt to narrow
preemptive scope.' 25
Furthermore, giving proper weight to the presence of a saving
clause will never act to unduly bar valid determinations of conflict
preemption. The Supremacy Clause ensures that actual conflicts between
federal and state laws will lead to the preemption of those state laws.
12 6
C. Clarification of FDA Approval and Manufacturers' Responsibilities
The Wyeth Court's holding, despite Phenergan's FDA approval,
rightfully casts Riegel "in the narrow light it deserves, as a case govern-
ing only the limited group of Class III devices that receive the most ri-
gorous FDA scrutiny available under federal law." 127 With its decision,
the Wyeth Court affirmed the notion that FDA approval of a drug is not
based on the optimal safety of a drug, but based only on the information
the FDA receives from the drug's manufacturer.
1 28
For close to fifty years, it has been the manufacturers' responsibility
to prove the safety of a drug in order to distribute the drug, instead of the
FDA's responsibility to prove a drug's harm in order to keep it out of the
market.'2 9 With a shift in the burden of proof, courts cannot assume that
the FDA has retained the same level of incentive or burden to actively
discover new risks posed by a drug. The FDA continues to be largely
dependent on the information provided by each manufacturer, and re-
moving the manufacturers' incentive to maintain the safety of the
drugs-by awarding them immunity in tort claims-would result in less
safe drugs.1 30 The FDA's report stating "the budget and staff of the
[FDA] are inadequate to permit the discharge of its existing responsibili-
ties for the protection of the American public"1 3 1 further supports this
view.1 32 The Wyeth Court's emphasis on the manufacturers' responsibili-
125. Id. at 23 (pointing out the problematic implications of this outcome); see also id. at 25
("[Mhe... savings regulation has the general effect of limiting preemption, while the 2006 language
carves out the widest possible pieemptive space.").
126. Zellmer, supra note 1, at 1733.
127. Id. at 1696.
128. See id. at 1694-95.
129. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1195 (2009) (referencing the 1962 amendment to the
FDCA shifting the burden of proof to the manufacturer).
130. Reid, supra note 116; see also Dawn Goulet, Consumer News, Supporters and Opponents
of Federal Preemption Take Sides, Anticipate High Court's Ruling on Third FDA Preemption Case
This Year, 21 LOy. CONSUMER L. REv. 96, 104 (2008) ("Congress never intended that FDA approv-
al give blank immunity to manufacturers from liability for injuries caused by their products." (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kennedy, Pallone Eye Legislation to Undo Preemption Rul-
ing, FDA WK., Feb. 29, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 4025500)).
131. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1202 n. 11 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting CITIZENS
ADVISORY COMM. ON THE FDA, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND
WELFARE, H.R. Doc. No. 84-227, at 53 (1955)).
132. See Goulet, supra note 130:
The [FDA's own science] board 'concluded that science at the FDA is in a precarious po-
sition,' and the agency 'is not positioned to meet the current or emerging regulatory re-
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ty of maintaining adequate warning labels appropriately rejects the
treatment of FDA approval as a conclusive statement of safety.133
Although Wyeth did not address Riegel's decision to include state
tort actions as falling within preemption, it restores the Lohr Court's fa-
vorable view of state tort claims. Though the Wyeth dissent argued that
the FDA's safety determinations should not be questioned, allowing state
tort judgments to proceed will increase consumer protection. As the
Wyeth Court stated, state tort suits often bring to light unknown dangers
of FDA approved drugs' 34 and motivate manufacturers to disclose those
risks.135 If FDA approval were to shield drug manufacturers from com-
mon-law liabilities, manufacturers might misrepresent information to the
FDA in order to attain approval. 36 Tort remedies, however, provide
manufacturers incentives to avoid liability by actively analyzing new
risks and working to improve the safety of their products.
1 37
D. The Effect of the Wyeth Court's Interpretation of the 2006 Preamble
Wyeth rejected the preemptive effect of the 2006 preamble as merit-
ing no deference. However, the Court's mere comparison to the DOT's
explanations in Geier fell short of setting the necessary precedent of re-
quiring a clear congressional intent for preemption. The Court should
have used the opportunity to invalidate Geier's dependence on agency
explanation by strictly relying on statutory text in its preemption analy-
sis.
The Wyeth Court acknowledged that certain agency views could
properly preempt state action through a thorough, consistent, and persua-
sive explanation regarding the obstacle that state tort actions would im-
pose on federal objectives. 38 The Court further noted that while "agen-
cies have no special authority to pronounce on pre-emption absent dele-
gation by Congress,"' 39 weight is given to agency views when "the sub-
ject matter is technical[,] and the relevant history and background are
complex and extensive."'14 By merely distinguishing the case from Gei-
sponsibilities.' It cited two resources for this deficiency: 1) demands on the FDA have
soared, and 2) resources allocated to the agency have not increased in proportion to those
demands.
(quoting SUBCOMM. ON SCI. & TECH., FDA, FDA SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK 2 (2007),
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/08/briefing/2008-4365bl_02-04-Subcommittee%20Report
%20on%2OScience%20and%2OTechnol.pdf).
133. See Zellmer, supra note 1, at 1694-95.
134. See Goulet, supra note 117, at 436 (praising the benefits of a dual system and recognizing
that state tort suits "may motivate injured persons to come forward with information" (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1202)).
135. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1202.
136. See Sharkey, supra note 3, at 238.
137. See Zellmer, supra note 1, at 1674.
138. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1201.
139. Id.
140. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000).
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er, the Wyeth Court failed to drive future decisions away from the recent
controversy regarding agency preemption determinations.
141
Under Executive Order 12,988, agencies must clearly specify the
preemptive effect of a law. 4 2 Furthermore, under Executive Order
13,132, agencies must provide states notice and an opportunity to com-
ment on regulations that may affect them. 43 This notice-and-comment
rulemaking, laid out in the Administrative Procedure Act, protects states
by ensuring that they are consulted for any preemption decisions.' 44 Al-
though Congress entrusted agencies with the authority to regulate, agen-
cies must adhere to the specificity and notice-and-rulemaking require-
ments in order to ensure that regulations reflect congressional intent.
145
Furthermore, these procedures prevent a boundless doctrine of implied
conflict preemption 146 and honor the crucial presumption against preemp-
tion when dealing with agency regulations. 1
47
Applying the above to Geier, the Court should have ended its analy-
sis when it found that the FMVSS lacked any specific intent to preempt
state tort actions. Because agencies have the ability to make their inten-
tions clear, courts should not encourage agencies 148 to deviate from these
procedures by taking into account an agency's views about how a state
action would create an obstacle to federal purposes and objectives. By
developing one strict standard, courts can avoid the debate regarding the
amount of deference given to agency views.
Additionally, any trend validating the Geier decision is troubling.
Allowing agencies to self-empower themselves to preempt state laws
without going through the proper procedures would completely bar a
private right of action. 149 While agencies can set forth rules under their
delegated authority, they lack the power to allow private rights of ac-
tion. 150 This result, coupled with an absence of a federal remedy under
the FDCA, would be at extreme odds with the two cornerstones of the
preemption jurisprudence. Congress, in its expansion of the FDA's regu-
latory authority, did not include a private right of action for damages in
141. See Sharkey, supra note 3, at 254.
142. Id. at 242 (citing Exec. Order No. 12,988, 61 Fed. Reg. 4729, 4731 (Feb. 5, 1996)).
143. Id. at 254-55 (citing Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255, 43,256 (Aug. 4,
1999)).
144. See id. at 254.
145. Geier, 529 U.S. at 907 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe power of pre-emption [is] squarely
in the hands of Congress.").
146. Sharkey, supra note 3, at 258 ("Agency preemption preambles represent the latest manife-
station of a broader trend of the increasing federalization of law governing products regulated in a
national market.").
147. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 907 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
148. Sharkey, supra note 3, at 254 (stating that "agencies are thumbing their noses at these
congressional and executive mandates").
149. See id. at 242.
150. Id. at 248 (recognizing that "[a]gencies may play the sorcerer's apprentice but not the
sorcerer himself' (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,291 (2001))).
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order to maintain the harmonious relationship between state and federal
regulations.1 5 1 Barring remedy through state tort actions would contradict
Congress's purpose 52 of having enacted the FDCA and would deny the
presumption against preemption without the required clear and manifest
purpose of Congress. 153 Because agencies, unlike Congress, are not
elected to represent the interests of states, their broad preemptive power
must be strictly regulated in order to prevent unjust results.
E. A Necessary Abandonment of the "Purposes and Objectives" Ob-
stacle Analysis
The concerns raised in permitting agencies to make their own
preemption determinations call for the abandonment of the Court's pur-
poses and objectives preemption jurisprudence employed in the obstacle
analysis. As Justice Thomas' concurrence in Wyeth states, the broad ap-
proach to the purposes and objectives determination has allowed courts
to make their own judgments outside of what has been clearly expressed
by the statutory text."
The Tenth Amendment states that "[t]he powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively."'155 In order to abide by the Constitu-
tion and preserve this balance of power, the Supremacy Clause and its
preemption doctrine should only be applied to federal laws that are
"made in Pursuance" of the Constitution.1 56 Therefore, it follows that
"pre-emptive effect be given only those to federal standards and policies
that are set forth in, or necessarily follow from, the statutory text."'
' 57
In order to better respect the purpose of Congress as the touchstone
of the preemption inquiry, the broad purposes and objectives determina-
tion, found in the Geier decision and followed by the Wyeth Court,
should be abandoned. The Geier Court's reliance on the DOT's state-
ments to concoct a federal objective of gradually phasing in a variety of
passive restraints was plainly at odds with the expressed purpose of the
151. See Diana Rabeh, Issues in the Third Circuit, Is Preemption Right for You?: The Third
Circuit Applies Preemption to a Misleading Drug Advertisement Claim in Pennsylvania Employee
Benefit Trust Fund v. Zeneca, Inc., 53 VILL. L. REV. 743, 749-51 (2008) (finding that "a private
right of action for damages was 'unnecessary' because a 'common law right of action exists' (quot-
ing Louis M. Bograd, Taking on Big Pharma--and the FDA, TRIAL, Mar. 2007, at 30, 30)).
152. Davis, supra note 2, at 1139 ("[Tlhe objective of the food and drug laws has been clear: to
protect the public health and safety from adulterated and misbranded drugs.").
153. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,485 (1996).
154. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1212 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring).
155. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
156. Wyeth, 129 S. CL at 1206 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).
157. Id. at 1207.
20101
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Safety Act "to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to persons
resulting from traffic accidents. 158
Future compliance with the Wyeth Court's purposes and objectives
jurisprudence will only lead to additional unconstitutional invalidations
of state laws. Although saving clauses are in place to limit the Court's
broad determinations of federal objectives, the Geier decision serves as a
warning that saving clauses are often overridden. Furthermore, in the
absence of the obstacle analysis, the impossibility analysis will continue
to properly preempt the necessary state laws. Expanding the impossibili-
ty analysis to include both a narrower physical impossibility and a
broader conflict impossibility will also allow courts to preempt state laws
that would impose contradictory duties 159 even if a manufacturer could
comply with both laws. This standard will preserve the holdings of Lohr
and Wyeth while appropriately directing future decisions away from Gei-
er. Basing implied preemption on the impossibility analysis would guar-
antee that the presumption against preemption will only be overridden
when the proper burden is met.
F. An Additional Suggestion to Balance Manufacturer Concerns in the
Preemption Battle
Requiring agencies to adhere to notice-and-comment rulemaking in
their preemption decisions, while abolishing the obstacle analysis, will
rightfully swing the preemption jurisprudence toward state sovereignty.
However, Congress has entrusted the FDA to regulate the safety and
effectiveness of drugs as "[t]he centerpiece of risk management," 160 and
these changes will undoubtedly bring harsh criticisms.
As pointed out by the Wyeth dissent, the FDA makes safety deter-
minations based on long-term costs and benefits, and the interests of all
potential users. 16 1 The dissent warns that if every state were "free to con-
tradict the FDA's expert determinations," others who would have bene-
fitted from the drug would suffer.162 Manufacturers could be doing all
they should to investigate potential new risks. Subjecting them to a my-
riad of state laws could shift their focus from improving their drugs to
constantly searching for potential new risks.
These concerns, in light of the proposed changes, require the estab-
lishment of a more instructive standard for prescription drugs. Like the
MDA classification of medical devices, prescription drugs should be
158. See id. at 1215 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. § 1381 (1988) (repealed 1994)).
159. See id. at 1209.
160. Id. at 1219 (alteration in original) (quoting Requirements on Content and Format of Labe-
ling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201,314, 601)).




classified based on the level of risk they pose to the public. Class Ell
drugs would require satisfaction of the most rigorous standards, and the
FDA should require the manufacturers of those drugs to report even in-
dividual cases of injury for immediate risk analysis and warning update.
Placing drugs such as Phenergan into the Class III category would pro-
vide courts with evidence of having complied with the most rigorous
safety standards. While the addition of a classification system for pre-
scription drugs would not necessarily act to bar state suits, it would set
stricter standards for Class III drugs and allow manufacturers to point to
their compliance to reduce or eliminate their liability in tort suits such as
Ms. Levine's.
CONCLUSION
The battle between federal preemption and state sovereignty, in
matters of safety regulations, has been the center of an ongoing debate.
In examining the preemption of a state tort action regarding the safety of
a prescription drug, the Wyeth Court followed the impossibility and the
obstacle analyses employed in prior implied preemption cases. The deci-
sion in Wyeth properly reemphasized the significance of the presumption
against preemption and the need for clear congressional intent to pre-
empt. By doing so, the Court gave weight to traditional state police pow-
ers and restored the meaning of saving clauses, which the Geier Court
had previously stripped.
However, the Court's preamble analysis did not go far enough. The
decision reveals the need for a stricter requirement of adhering to the
notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures to reflect congressional in-
tent. Furthermore, the Wyeth Court's following of Geier's "purposes and
objectives" jurisprudence raises concerns about the textual validity of a
federal objective determination. Therefore, this Comment suggests that
the Court fully abandon the obstacle analysis. In doing so, the Court
should expand the impossibility analysis to encompass both physical
impossibility and conflict impossibility, to assure that implied preemp-
tion will adequately preempt state laws that impose a contradictory duty.
In light of these changes, this Comment suggests the classification of
drugs to provide a safeguard for manufacturers in future state tort ac-
tions.
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